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Minimum wages are usually assumed to be inefficient as they prevent the full exploitation of mutual gains from trade. Yet advocates of wage regulation policies have repeatedly claimed that this loss in market efficiency can be justified by the pursuit of ethical goals. Policy makers, it is argued, should not focus on efficiency alone. Rather, they should try to find an adequate balance between efficiency and equity targets. This idea is based on a two-worlds-paradigm that sees ethics and economics as two inherently conflicting ways of thinking. We, however, believe that this view of the relationship between ethics and economics is fundamentally flawed and blurs our understanding of how an ethically responsible regulation of the labour market should be conducted. In drawing on an economic-ethical approach that resolves the antinomy between efficiency and equity, we show that ethics and economics are, in fact, two sides of the same coin and that minimum wage legislation can only be ethically responsible, if it is at the same time economically efficient. In other words, we can have our cake and eat it too. On the basis of our approach, we develop two simple game theoretical models for different types of labour markets and derive policy implications from an economic-ethical viewpoint. We suggest that under the assumption of perfectly competitive labour markets a tax-funded wage subsidy is preferable over minimum wages, as it makes everyone better off. If, however, employers have monopsony power in the wage setting process, the minimum wage is justifiable under certain conditions.
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Minimum wage laws are well-entrenched labour market institutions in most industrialised countries nowadays. Even though it is commonly argued that such market interventions are economically inefficient, wage regulation policies have a broad base of supporters who think they can justify interventionist measures ethically. They argue on the presupposition that economic efficiency and ethics inherently conflict and believe that we have to target a healthy balance between economic and ethical ends (e.g. Okun, 1975). In our view, the implicit conflict view of economics and ethics has caused a lot of confusion. It is responsible for a backward oriented understanding of the inter-discipline of economic ethics and offers very little assistance in regards to the particular problem of minimum wages.

In this paper we introduce an increasingly recognised approach to economic ethics in order to open up a new perspective on the minimum wage debate. We show how the relationship between economics and ethics has to be theoretically reworked in order to obtain a new perspective on the ethical dimension of minimum wage legislation which is not constrained by the outdated conflict paradigm. Our theoretical framework resolves the conflict between efficiency and equity and shows that the most commonly proclaimed argument for the minimum wage which is based on the presumptive antinomy of economics and ethics is flawed. Opposing common belief, we argue that we can have our cake and eat it too! Efficient and ethical outcomes are the same. We draw a twofold conclusion. On the basis of two simple game-theoretical models we show that minimum wages are justifiable only under a renegade model of the labour market which assumes that employers have monopsony power over workers. If the labour market is subject to such market imperfection, it can be shown that outcomes will be inefficient. A regulatory minimum wage can help to overcome inefficiency and is thus justified within our economic-ethical framework. If, however, we presuppose the standard model of perfectly competitive markets, we can show that the minimum wage is not justifiable, since better alternatives exist. Under standard assumptions it follows that minimum wages need to be repealed in favour of a free market arrangement in conjunction with a tax-financed wage subsidy.

The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: (1) First we explain our economic-ethical approach. We outline our scientific-theoretical understanding of the relationship between ethics and economics and put forward a general methodology for economic-ethical inquiry. Furthermore, we define a criterion of ethical legitimacy. (2) In a next step we discuss a few common objections most frequently uttered against the approach we take. We use the discussion to point to possible misconceptions and in order to clarify our methodology further. (3) Then we embark upon an economic-ethical case study of the minimum wage using the methodology outlined in the previous chapters. (4) In a final section we summarise our findings and conclude with a brief discussion of our results.
1.		Economic-Ethical Framework

A vast share of the economic-ethical literature sees an irresolvable conflict between efficiency and equity. It is most commonly suggested that when dealing with economic-ethical problems we are to find a balance between two inherently conflicting ends (e.g. Okun, 1975). Some authors even claim that economic thinking has to be thought of as subordinate to ethical considerations and that economic rationality has to be transformed ethically (e.g. Ulrich 1993, 2001). We think that these approaches cause confusion and lay out the wrong way to tackle the problem of economic-ethics in general and the problem of minimum wages in particular. They are doomed to fail, as they do not address the issue of how it can be ensured that ethical norms are actually obeyed.​[1]​ In the following we, therefore, present an increasingly recognised economic-ethical approach which resolves the presupposed conflict between economic and ethical ends, solves the implementation problem and opens up a new perspective on the discussion of minimum wage laws. In attributing to ethics the role of the goal-setter and to economics the function of the implementation of ethical goals, our approach shows how economics and ethics can be mediated from a scientific-theoretical viewpoint. It clarifies further how economic and ethical rationality can be accommodated in one coherent framework. The basic insight that economic and ethical rationality conflict under specific circumstances which are referred to as dilemma structures (DS, henceforth) helps us to identify a general methodology of overcoming economic-ethical problems which we apply to the minimum wage debate below. We draw attention to the importance of institutional change in economic-ethics, as it comes clear that economic-ethical problems can be systematically solved through rule changes on the level of economic institutions. Well-designed economic institutions enable individuals to interact egoistically and behave ethically at the same time which resolves the conflict between economic and ethical rationality and thus solves the implementation problem.

The foundations of the economic-ethical approach we adopt were mainly laid by the pioneering work of Buchanan (e.g. Buchanan, 1959, 1975; Buchanan and Tullock, 1962; Brennan and Buchanan, 1985). Subsequent authors notably Homann (e.g. Homann, 2003; Homann and Suchanek, 2000/2005) have adopted Buchanan's research programme and worked on theoretical refinements, concreteness and applicability. Central to the approach that has emerged from these authors’ efforts is the familiar notion that society, and the economic process in particular, is a ‘joint venture for mutual advantage’ (Rawls, 1999, p. 6). In society everyone’s well-being relies on others. We have a common interest in bundling our strengths and working collectively and we want an economic system in which mutually beneficial transactions can take place between us and others. But, of course, we are not indifferent when it comes to the distribution of the proceeds. As (mutually indifferent and economically) rational agents we will always try to increase our share, even on the expense that everybody else is worse off. Thus, our joint societal effort is marked by a shared interest in a functioning economic order that allows the maximal acquisition of mutual gains from interactions with others and conflicting interests in the distribution of these gains (Petrick and Pies, 2007).

The cognoscenti has readily realised that this societal situation can be theoretically reconstructed using game theory. In various games the interacting parties have common and conflicting interests, the most well-known of which is the prisoner's dilemma, as depicted in Figure 1. Two players, 1 and 2, interact symmetrically and have an identical strategy set that encompasses a cooperative strategy C and a defective strategy D.​[2]​ Ordinal preferences are numbered 1 to 4, where a high number indicates a high preference. As a reminder we shall point out that the conflict of interests in this game is manifested by the fact that each player prefers the other player's cooperation, whereas the other player prefers to defect. But players also have a common interest which becomes obvious through a swift analysis. The most likely outcome of the game is that both players defect, since, individually speaking, D is the best strategy to play regardless what the other player does. Players, thus, end up in box IV. This outcome is Pareto-inefficient which means that both players, if they could individually pick the outcome, would prefer I over IV.









DS as depicted by the prisoner’s dilemma can be assumed to be omnipresent in human interactions and social institutions since they are, as Rawls’s quote makes clear, an essential property of society.​[3]​ As everybody suffers damage from DS we offer the following proposition.

(1)	Overcoming DS in pursuit of efficient outcomes is the central problem of 	economic-ethics.

Note that in this proposition, efficiency assumes the role of an ethical goal. This might cause confusion and requires an explanation, as it is most commonly assumed that efficiency belongs in the realm of economics and not ethics. Before we proceed it is, therefore, instructive to briefly meditate on the relationship between ethics and economics. We understand ethics as the discipline which at the most fundamental level of reflection seeks to evaluate what is good and what is right. In other words, it asks what is worth pursuing and what should be done. Whereas descriptive sciences are definable by their scientific objects, the scope of ethics can be understood best through the logical peculiarity of its assertions. As opposed to descriptive scientific claims of the form ‘A causes B’ or ‘From A follows B’ ethical statements have a normative content.​[4]​ They have the formal shape of an ‘ought’ in that they say what is to be done and what is preferable. Ethics, thus, transcends the boundaries of other disciplines and can be found  whenever and wherever it is argued that something ought to be the case or ought to be done. One can, for instance, discuss a biological or medical issue ethically. And, of course, the same holds for economics. This explains the phenomenon of hyphenated ethics such as bio-ethics, medical-ethics or economic-ethics. Economics on the other hand deals with the analysis of human behaviour and interactions from a descriptive viewpoint and from such a viewpoint only. Properly understood, economic statements do not carry any normative implications whatsoever (Friedman, 1953). And even though people who are economists by profession regularly engage themselves in normative debates, in doing so, they overstep what is, in a positivist scientific-theoretical understanding anyway, the borders of their domain. At exactly this point, i.e. when an economist says what should be done or what is preferable, he ceases to be an economist and mutates into a normative economist, that is to say an ethicist.​[5]​ As Buchanan (1989) points out the economy does not have a purpose at all. Its purpose is merely what people want it to be. Accordingly, economics as the science of the economy can only point out what should be done, if one wants to achieve a certain aim. The imperatives uttered by economists are, without a philosophical basis anyway, merely hypothetical in nature. These preliminaries should suffice to make clear that the Pareto-efficiency criterion qua normative is an ethical rather than an economic proposition. This fact, however, is concealed by the deep entrenchment of Pareto-efficiency in economic science. The seemly economic proposition that social state A is Pareto-better than social state B is, in fact, not an economic statement at all. It is a normative judgement that says we ought to choose A over B. As such it is formally ethical, in the sense that it has the logical form of an ethical proposition. It is evident that this reasoning shatters the two-worlds-paradigm which claims that economic and ethical aims are bound to collide. They can per definitionem not. It is natural, however, to ask whether the efficiency principle apart from its formal conformity with an ethical criterion is also a good ethical criterion. Especially those who believe in the two-worlds-paradigm of efficiency and equity will entertain doubts in regards to this claim. Given the scope of the present discussion we, of course, cannot give an encompassing account of the ethical preferability of the efficiency criterion. Yet we shall outline briefly what we hold to be the strengths of Pareto-efficiency as an ethical principle. These become most clearly visible as we contrast Pareto-efficiency with its obvious theoretical alternative, the principle of utility maximisation. A vast share of economic theory was built on the normative foundation of utilitarianism and utility maximisation still plays a major role in practical public policy, as the heavy use of cost-benefit methodologies indicates. The utilitarian faces two well-known complications. The first is methodological. It is unclear, how if any utility can be objectively measured and interpersonally compared. The second objection is ethical. Even if utility could be compared throughout individuals, how do we justify sacrificing one person’s well-being to promote another’s? The idea that a person is instrumentalised for the benefit of another conflicts with the well-entrenched moral principle that everyone is to be treated as an end in itself and never as a means (Kant, 1785/1993). The Pareto-criterion solves both these problems. First, it does not require interpersonal comparability. And second, it protects all individuals against being instrumentalised. The efficiency criterion might become even more palatable as attention is called to the fact that it is, in fact, nothing else but an abbreviation for the age-old ethical principle of unanimous consent, as used in contractualist approaches to moral philosophy such as in Hobbes (1651/1955) and Locke (1704/1952) and more recently by authors such as Rawls (1999) and Nozick (1975). It is, therefore, clearly consistent with the principles of modern democracy.

In the light of the above it should have become clear that efficiency is not a menace to ethics, as supporters of the two-worlds-paradigm believe, but itself an ethical goal that guides economic inquiry. Thus, we do not have to make a choice between ethical and economic goals. We do not have to constrain the pursuit of efficiency for ethical reasons. This is so, simply because the often proclaimed conflict between ethics and economics does not exist. We can have our cake and eat it too, since economics and ethics do not have conflicting purposes! Within the economic-ethical endeavour ethics plays the role of the goal-setter for the economic discourse in that it generates an idea of what is worth pursuing. This idea is efficiency. Economics can be seen as merely an extension of the ethical exercise which focuses on the realisation of what the ethical discourse has found to be worth-pursuing.

Assuming our line of thought is so far accepted, we can proceed to ask how efficient outcomes can be achieved in DS. As explained above, individually rational behaviour leads to self-damage. Many authors, ethicists as well as economists, have suggested that individuals should transform their bahaviour in the light of what is ethically desirable (e.g. Ulrich, 1993 and 2001; Habermas, 1962/1990, Steinmann and Löhr, 1992; Laffont, 1975; Etzioni, 1987). Individuals should depart from economic reasoning and adopt a moral point of view. In order to understand what this means it is instructive at this point to examine the differences between the individual economic calculus and individual ethical thinking. In applying economic logic we only consider our individual payoff and are indifferent in regards to the well-being of others.​[6]​ From an economic point of view it does not matter, if others suffer losses from our behaviour. Things change as we look at economic problems from a moral point of view. In this case the payoffs to others become quite relevant, as everybody should behave so as to promote the common good. For the purpose of concreteness let us briefly take a look at two well-known explications of the moral point of view, Kant’s Categorical Imperative (CI) and the Golden Rule (GR). The CI in its ‘universal law formula’ commands to ‘Act only according to that maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law’ (Kant, 1785/1993). It, thus, lays out a test for the moral quality of individual behaviour. We are supposed to formulate a maxim, or decision logic, that governs our behaviour. Then we are to recast this maxim on the collective of agents. Everyone is assumed to adopt it. It is then asked whether we can possibly will that the maxim is, in fact, generally adopted. Using this hypothetical generalisation we are in some sense confronted with the (positive and/or negative) effects of our behaviour on others. The effects of our actions are, thus, internalised and the economic calculus is ethically transformed. The GR basically sings the same tune using a simpler formula. It commands us to treat others as we would want to be treated by others. With this principle, too, we counterfactually internalise the effects of our behaviour on others. We can now contrast the behavioural implications from both viewpoints in regards to the DS. As stated above, individual economic logic recommends defection, since this strategy optimises the payoff to the individual. However, if we put defection to the test from the moral point of view, it is not advisable anymore. This is plausible in both the Kantian and GR version. For compare C and D as candidates for universal laws. If individual payoff maximisation became a universal law, every individual would choose D in a dilemma situation and we would constantly end up in the inefficient box IV. In contrast, if everyone adopted the maxim to choose the strategy which maximises the payoff to the other person, we would all cooperate and end up in the desired quadrant I where everyone is better off than in IV. Following a slightly different reasoning, we get the same normative implication from the GR. It is obvious from Figure 1 that we prefer our interaction partner in the PD to cooperate, since this makes us better off no matter what strategy we choose. We would certainly want to be treated cooperatively and, thus, by the GR, we should treat others alike. To sum it up, an ethical transformation of individual behaviour is, at least in principle, capable of promoting the ethical end of efficiency in a DS.

However, the question arises how we can ensure that everybody does, in fact, behave ethically? Ethics faces an implementation problem, since from the individual’s perspective ethical behaviour is economically inferior. In regards to this problem it has been suggested that economic-ethics has a pedagogic task to fulfil in order to guarantee the implementation of moral norms (e.g. Ulrich, 1993, 2001, Habermas, 1962/1990). Using ethical reasons, it is claimed, ethicists should educate people about the desirability of cooperative behaviour. The force of good ethical reasons will then ensure that individuals recognise the necessity of moral behaviour and interact accordingly. But is this really enough to overcome the implementation problem? There are good reasons to think otherwise. In giving this answer economic-ethics stays ‘in a bad sense idealistic’ (Homann, 2001). In merely appealing to individuals to behave morally, we would allow immoral individuals to exploit the moral conduct of others which, in turn, would lead to a gradual ‘erosion of morals’. Furthermore, even if all individuals were morally motivated, there would still be a potential for failure. Once trapped in a DS individuals would recognise that the cooperative outcome is inherently instable, since the other individuals have an incentive to act immorally. In this case they might choose a strategy of ‘protective counter-defection’ (Homann and Lütge, 2004/2005) in order to prevent their exploitation by others. Thus, if we were simply to appeal to individuals to play cooperatively, we would de facto ignore the economic finding that real live actors are quite likely to do otherwise. We would ignore the implementation task of economic-ethics.

Our approach gives a different answer to the problem of implementation. Following Buchanan (1990), Homann (2003), Homann and Lütge (2004/2005) and Homann and Suchanek (2000/2005) we believe that securing the implementation of ethical goals is an economic task. It must be ensured that ethical behaviour yields a higher economic payoff to the individual than unethical behaviour (Homann, 2001). The only way to secure this lies in an economic investigation of the circumstances under which individuals will find it economically advantageous to behave ethically. The solution to the implementation problem of ethics lies in a change of the underlying distributive rules which determine the structure of payoffs to the individuals and cause the implementation problem in the first place. These distributive rules we shall refer to as economic institutions. Implementing ethics means nothing else than reshaping economic institutions in such a way as to design an interaction structure in which individuals can both act morally and follow their own economic interests at the same time. We need to change the payoffs of the interaction in order to create an equilibrium in mutual cooperation. This is done by introducing a new rule which alters the exogenous payoff parameters of the DS. In that it assures an efficient outcome this new rule may itself be called Pareto-superior. There is potentially an infinite number of such Pareto-better rules. We can either punish D or reward C or use any combination thereof. Figure 2 shows what such a transformation may result in.









So far we have argued that the overcoming of DS in pursuit of efficient outcomes is the central concern of economic-ethics. Now we have found a general methodology that can be used whenever we are confronted with a DS.

(2)	The problem of DS is to be solved at the level of economic institutions 	through a change to a Pareto-superior rule.

We are now endowed with a general methodology of solving dilemma structures. What remains to be clarified, however, is how the concept of a dilemma structure itself is to be used methodologically. We suggest the following usage.

(3)	The concept of a DS is to be used as a heuristic. Every interaction that is 	subject to economic-ethical investigation has to be modelled in terms of 	a DS, if possible.

As suggested by Homann and Suchanek (2000/2005) as well as Petrick and Pies (2007), in doing so we can first of all understand why interactions fail. Furthermore, in applying the heuristic of DS to successful interactions we are able to diagnose a potential for failure. The latter is important, as Homann and Suchanek (2000/2005) argue, because we might face a hidden DS which exists under the surface, ‘lying wait’ (Homann and Suchanek, 2000/2005, 384), as it were. As societal, cultural or economic factors change, a hidden DS might come back to life and wreck havoc.

It is now instructive to specify how the methodological steps outlined above can help us in an ethical evaluation of the minimum wage. On the basis of what has been said, how do we judge, whether or not minimum wages are ethically justified? In summary, the economic-ethical exercise can be understood as an attempt to overcome DS in the pursuit of Pareto-efficient outcomes. DS are to be solved through the application of a general methodology which aims at institutional change through the introduction of Pareto-superior rules. The justification of the prescribed rule changes depends on the rules’ Pareto-superiority relative to the institutional arrangement that constitutes the status quo. Likewise, the justification of a given rule system, such as a minimum wage law, must consist in the absence of a rule which would induce a relative Pareto-improvement. In other words, within our economic-ethical approach minimum wages are justified, if and only if they are Pareto-efficient. Therefore, we have to examine, whether a departure from minimum wages would lead to a relative Pareto-improvement. If that is the case, ethical legitimacy will be negated. If it is not, minimum wages we will be regarded as ethically justified. This leads us to a further proposition.

(4)	An existing institutional arrangement is ethically justified, if and only if 	there is no Pareto-superior alternative.






Before we move on to the case study we would like to address a few criticisms and add a few clarifications to our methodology. We shall confine ourselves to answering four objections which we think seem quite natural.

The first form of critique might take exception to our economic-ethical approach in so far as it involves the imposition of rule changes onto individuals. It seems as though such interference, however in the interest of the individuals, is paternalistic and not justifiable without the individuals’ consent. As implied above, this objection does not carry any force, since the efficiency criterion can be understood as an abbreviation of unanimous consensus. A Pareto-superior rule is per definitionem one that individuals would agree to, since it assures an economic outcome which they prefer over the status quo.

A further objection might take essentially the same line, yet with an epistemological twist. It could be argued that our approach might be right in principle. In practice, however, it is doomed to fail, since we do not possess absolute knowledge of the individual preference orders. It is claimed that we need such knowledge in order to apply the efficiency criterion. Note that this objection does not concern solely the approach taken by us, but poses a serious problem for any branch of economics which uses the same criterion. As Buchanan (1959) argues, however, the methodology we rely on, unlike others, does not fall into the epistemological trap, as it opens up the possibility of an empirical verification of efficiency. This test is based on the simple yet brilliant insights of Wicksell (1896) who sought a criterion for the evaluation of efficiency. Wicksell recognised that the only sound basis for the empirical verification of efficiency is an actual unanimous consent of the individuals.​[7]​ Unanimous consent has thus a twofold status within our economic-ethical framework. As a theoretical postulate is assures the ethical legitimacy of our approach. As a criterion of verification it enables us to examine the accuracy of our theoretical assertions empirically. Since this is a theoretical paper, we have to leave the task of empirical verification aside. However, it shall be noted that the theoretical conclusions which we derive below have the scientific-theoretical status of an empirically testable hypothesis and are, therefore, in line with the positivist scientific paradigm.

Another objection is quite valid and calls for a minor refinement. It could be suggested that it is not always desirable to resolve DS. Market economy is founded on the principle of competition, for instance. Competitors on the same market side are trapped in a DS. It is not desirable that this DS is solved, since, if it was and competitors cooperated, this would be detrimental to society. The answer to this critique is, as Petrick and Pies (2007) make clear, that the heuristic of DS has to be applied in a sufficiently differentiated way. We cannot simply focus on atomic interactions. Rather, we always have to keep the big picture in mind. Sometimes DS are nested into one another and it may turn out that stabilizing a particular DS is for the sake of solving a higher order DS. This can be illustrated in the case of competition. Even though competitors in a particular market find it desirable to collude, they have a higher-order interest in institutionalised competition. They are at the same time customers in other markets and gain from the fact that there is competition in these markets. This guarantees them cheep and high-quality products. Stabilising competition rather than collusion is in their own higher-level interest, since they can be expected to incur a net gain from competition as a generalised norm.

The last criticism we would like to discuss concerns the Pareto-efficiency criterion. As mentioned above, its ethical preferability lies partly in the fact that it protects individuals against being instrumentalised for the benefit of others. As a general norm the non-instrumentalisation principle seems quite plausible. However, there are examples when doubts might arise. This is the case, for instance, when we have to evaluate two distributions of, say, dollar amounts, A and B, between individual 1 and individual 2, where A=(10,10) and B=(9,1000). Both of these distributions are efficient according to the Pareto-rule, since it is not possible to move from A to B or vice versa without making either 1 or 2 worse off. Yet B looks much more attractive, since as we move from A to B 1 loses much less than 2 gains. Distribution B is superior to A according to the Kaldor-Hicks-efficiency criterion (Kaldor, 1939; Hicks, 1939), since in distribution B 2 could compensate 1 for the loss of one dollar and still be better off. This example might be taken to indicate that we should change our notion of efficiency and accept the Kaldor-Hicks version instead of Pareto’s. We, however, insist on the normative status of the Pareto-criterion. As we consider the case more closely, we realise that we do not have a valid basis for an interpersonal judgement that does not violate the requirement of ethical neutrality between 1 and 2. Thus, Pareto-efficiency remains the central ethical goal in our approach. However, the present case makes clear that we need yet another methodological refinement and add a further proposition to our methodology.

(5)	If we do not find a Pareto-better state of affairs, we should look for a Kaldor-	Hicks-superior state. If we can find one, there is a potential for a 	Pareto-improvement.

In the present case the Kaldor-Hicks-superior status of B relies on the fact that 2 can compensate 1 for the loss of one dollar. B offers a potential for a Pareto-improvement over A in so far as we only need to find a redistributive rule that transforms B into a distribution B’ that is de facto Pareto-superior to A. Thus, we adopt the methodological principle that whenever the search for a Pareto-better outcome fails, we look for a Kaldor-Hicks-superior outcome and try to find a distributive rule that generates a Pareto-superior state.


3.		Case Study: The Economic-Ethics of the Minimum Wage














In a further step we need to determine the preferences of both workers and firms in regards to the quadrants I-IV in order to fully identify the game and predict the parties’ choices. This might seem like a straightforward task. However, the theory of the economic dynamics of minimum wages has, in fact, become quite complex. We, therefore, provide a short overview over the most important theoretical and empirical findings in the literature.

The economic literature about minimum wages predominantly discusses the question how employers will respond to wage floors. The standard model, which assumes a perfectly competitive labour market, provides the following familiar sounding answer. The establishment of a wage floor above the competitive rate will induce perfectly competitive firms to reduce employment (Stigler, 1946). The reason simply is that, if the minimum wage exceeds the marginal product of labour, firms will lose their incentive to employ as many people. Thus labour demand is a decreasing function of wage with the proportional reduction in employment being equal to the proportional wage increase times the elasticity of demand. In a two-sector model the disemployment effects from minimum wages are less drastic. Unemployed workers, it is claimed, may find work in sectors that are not covered by minimum wage legislation (i.e. wage floors have been negotiated by unions in a specific sector only). Other factors that impact on the disemployment effects are the level of homogeneity of workers and potential substitution of other production factors. Neglecting these as well as the implications of the two-sector model may result in overestimating the disemployment effects of the minimum wage.​[9]​ None the less economists generally agree that wage floors cause net job losses. Wessels (1980), Brown, Gilroy and Kohen (1982), and Brown (1988) each provide literature reviews that support this consensus. Empirical studies generally find that a 10 percent increase in the minimum wage has a disemployment effect of 1 to 3 percent (Brown, 1988).

The consensus, however, is not unanimous. Several influential studies have failed to detect this negative employment effect predicted by the standard model (Katz and Krueger, 1992; Card 1992a, 1992b; Card and Krueger, 1994, 1995). Each of these studies finds either an insignificant or even positive impact of wage floors on employment. Katz and Krueger (1992) detect higher employment after an increase in the minimum wage in the Texan fast-food industry. Card (1992a), using Current Population Survey data, concludes that there is no evidence of a disemployment effect on teenagers after the 1990 increase in the minimum wage. He also finds no significant negative employment effect after a rise in minimum wages in California (1992b). Card and Krueger (1994) examine the impact of minimum wage on employment in the fast-food industry in New Jersey and Pennsylvania. The authors not only find no indication that the rise in the minimum wage reduced employment but also suggest that the rise in the minimum wage in New Jersey may have increased employment in the fast-food industry. To explain these findings, which seem to contradict the conclusions of the standard model, the authors point towards what we shall refer to as the renegade model of labour markets (see also Burdett and Mortensen, 1998; Manning, 2003, 2004). The renegade model assumes that labour markets are best approximated by a monopsonistic structure and challenges the hypothesis of the standard model that the wage elasticity of the labour supply curve is infinite (i.e. the smallest of wage cuts will cause all workers to leave the firm). Several reasons are suggested why this may not be the case. It may, for instance, be costly for workers to change jobs. Furthermore employees may have imperfect information about alternative jobs or non-wage job attributes may convince staff to stay. It is, therefore, conjectured that employers have some monopsony power of their workers and they are expected to use it. As a consequence of the employer’s monopsony power, employees are paid less than their marginal productivity in equilibrium. Thus the introduction of a minimum wage between the original monopsony wage and the competitive wage will increase both employment and efficiency. Similar results are obtained by an equilibrium search model in which firms announce wages and employees search among posted offers (see e.g. Mortensen, 1988). More recently, several studies have provided additional empirical support for the monopsony model. Bell (1997) found that a very low value of the minimum wage had no impact on employment in Mexico in the 1980s. Feliciano (1998) identified strong differentiated impacts of minimum wages in Mexico between 1970 and 1990. A reduction of the minimum wage increased employment of women aged 15-64, but reduced employment of older male workers. Saget (2001) concluded that minimum wage had only an insignificant effect on the level of employment in Latin America in the 1990s. A cross-section study in France (Bruno and Cazes, 1997) found no impact of minimum wage on youth unemployment.

The renegade model, however, has not gained wide recognition in political and economic circles and several empirical studies have challenged the findings by Katz and Krueger (1992), Card (1992a, 1992b) and Card and Krueger (1994, 1995). For example, Neumark and Wascher (1992, 2000) and Deere, Murphy and Welch (1995) use data similar to Card (1992a, 1992b) and find a negative employment effect of wage floors in the US. Taylor and Kim (1995), using a different data set, could not confirm the findings by Card (1992b) and find negative employment effects after an increase in the minimum wage in California in 1988. Finally, Neumark and Wascher (1995, 2000) analyse the same event as Card and Krueger (1994) with a similar data set. The authors detect a decline in employment after a raise in the minimum wage in the fast-food industry in New Jersey​[10]​.






Assuming we deal with a labour market structure that can be approximated by perfect competition our model can be further specified as follows. Workers prefer firms to employ a higher quantity of labour, as the degree of unemployment negatively influences their expected wage through an increase in unemployment risk. If a minimum wage is in place, firms will employ fewer workers, thus QW < QW. Therefore workers prefer quadrant II over I and IV over III. Trivially, since the minimum wage is higher than the competitive market wage, W > W, III is preferred over I and IV over II. In addition we shall assume that the wage floor induced unemployment risk is outweighed by the difference between W and W. Otherwise workers would be quite unlikely to lobby for a minimum wage. Thus, we arrive at the complete preference order for workers:  IV > III > II > I. Firms prefer workers to play W, thus I > III and II > IV. If workers choose W, they prefer QW. Therefore, we have II > I. And if workers choose W, firms prefer QW. Thus, we have III > IV. This yields the complete preference order: II > I > III > IV. We can now number the quadrants in accordance to the players’ preferences from 1 to 4, where a high number indicates a high preference.











The outcome of this game is quadrant III. The workers’ decision to play W is not dependent on the firms strategy choice. Given the workers’ strategy firms will play QW which is the profit optimising quantity to employ. Are we dealing with a DS here? Not at first glance. There is no Pareto-superior quadrant, as would be required to answer this question in the affirmative. Moving to any quadrant where workers are better of, i.e. IV, would make firms worse off. And moving to any quadrant where firms would be better off, i.e. I and II, would make workers worse off. But note that the total surplus of quadrant II is greater than the surplus of quadrant III with the difference being the deadweight loss from wage floors. According to the Kaldor-Hicks-efficiency criterion, quadrant II is superior to quadrant III and it should therefore be possible to find a rule that makes everyone better off. In order to reach quadrant II, workers obviously have to forego their demands for a wage floor. If and only if they do so, it is optimal for firms to employ the efficient quantity of labour which clears the market. But why would workers do that? In exchange for their choosing W workers will call for an appropriate compensation that is at least as high as the difference in expected utility between quadrant III and quadrant II. Obviously, a Pareto-superior rule cannot entail a direct compensation of workers through firms. If it did, it would not change the status quo and firms would still employ the same number of workers as if the minimum wage was still in place. We need a mediator who guarantees workers compensation conditional on their choosing W and requires firms to pay an incentive-compatible lump-sum tax independent of their subsequent employment decisions. The level of the tax should be set as high as is necessary in order to collect sufficient funds for workers’ compensation. Since a lump-sum tax does not influence firms’ employment decisions, under such a rule, firms will choose to employ an efficient amount of labour. Such a rule will realise the productive potential that is lost through minimum wages and will make everyone better off. Levying the tax will not force any firm to leave the market which would have stayed in under a minimum wage policy. Rather, it will enable firms to increase profits and will furthermore increase the aggregate income of low-wage workers.

In terms of concrete policy measures there are four compensation mechanisms which in conjunction with an abolition of wage floors implement the main idea outlined above. Compensation is paid either directly or indirectly and it flows either to workers or to employers.​[11]​ These basic instruments open up a potentially infinite space of possible policy mixes. Two forms of policies are particularly common. The first is a cut in social security contributions as an indirect wage subsidy to employers. This policy is emphasised in various continental European countries, especially France, Belgium and the Netherlands. The second is a tax credit which serves as a direct wage subsidy. Tax credits tend to be preferred in Anglo-Saxon countries (Bruecker and Konle-Seidl, 2006). Even though we generally regard these measures with favour, note that their practical political use often expands beyond what is warranted by the conclusions drawn above. They only ‘roughly’ implement our suggestions. Since it is beyond the scope of this paper to examine how far actual policy measures accord with the implications of our model, we shall confine ourselves to giving one short example. Let us consider the practice of direct wage subsidies. Two terms most commonly associated with this instrument are the American style ‘earned income tax credit’ (EITC) and the UK’s ‘working tax credits’ (WTC). The EITC and WTC are tax refunds which are intended to enhance a low-wage worker’s after-tax income. Their size depends negatively on the taxable aggregate income. In so far as these measures counterbalance shocks to disposable after-tax income, they can serve as a compensation mechanism against changes in minimum wage legislation. However, since EITC and WTC are calculated on the basis of the worker’s aggregate income, they do more than what they should do. They also compensate workers for income shocks which have nothing to do with policy changes. If a worker, for instance, simply chooses to work less, she suffers a self-induced income shock and is compensated under EITC and WTC. Is this compensation justified? The answer is no. The workers’ entitlement to compensation is conditional on their willingness to give up something in return. In the above model employers and workers ‘trade’, as it were, the workers’ consent to a policy change against a monetary compensation in order to achieve an efficient outcome. In the case of a worker choosing to work less such a trade does not exist. Thus EITC and WTC are too far-reaching. Workers’ compensation should be confined to outbalancing the negative income effects of a policy change only.​[12]​ EITC and WTC can only approximate, however, not fully replicate the ideas we have presented above.






Let us now examine what follows ethically in regards to the justification of the minimum wage, as we adopt the renegade model. If we assume that labour markets are better approximated by this theoretical alternative, we need a slightly different model specification. Evidently, firms’ preferences do not change at all. Firms still prefer workers to play W rather than W in conjunction with every quantity of labour they choose to demand and per definitionem they prefer to play QW, if workers play W and QW, if workers play W. This gives us the complete preference order: II > I > III > IV. We shall now assume that workers have a choice between a free market wage W and minimum wage W. Note that we stipulate the latter to be exactly equal to the workers’ marginal productivity when markets are cleared and when there is no excess supply of labour. W thus maximises employment at employment level QW. We furthermore premise that workers prefer a situation with minimum wages and less than full employment, i.e. IV, over a situation with full employment and without minimum wages, i.e. I.​[13]​ In comparison with the above model workers’ preferences change slightly. Whereas they still prefer W over W, they now favour QW over QW, since now QW is the maximum employment level and optimises their job security. The complete preference order is: III > IV > I > II.








Does this game constitute a DS? A Pareto-improvement is not possible, since every move away from III that would benefit firms, i.e. towards I or II, would harm workers. And there is no quadrant that workers value at least as highly as III. A Kaldor-Hicks-improvement is equally impossible, since per definitionem an abolition of the wage floor would induce firms to employ fewer workers. Under the minimum wage the efficiency condition that marginal productivity has to equal wage is qua premise fulfilled and thus every departure from the wage regulation policy W (i.e. increasing or lowering the minimum wage or its abolition) will necessarily lead to a decrease in production and to someone being worse off. Such a rule would not find the consent of all individuals involved, as is required by our approach, and would, therefore, not be justifiable. Since the absence of a potential Pareto-improvement justifies the status quo, it is now obvious that this result legitimises the minimum wage under the premises stipulated. While supporters of the minimum wage usually claim that wage floors are necessary for reasons independent from economic considerations, we have found another, and in our view more reasonable, justification. In the renegade model the minimum wage is ethically justified, because it is economically efficient. As has become clear, its legitimacy can only be shown, if its efficiency is empirically substantiated. We therefore suggest that sympathisers of wage regulation policies devote their resources to investigating further the validity of the claim that wage floors can be efficient and the conditions under which this is the case.






This article aimed at an economic-ethical evaluation of the minimum wage in one coherent interdisciplinary framework. We introduced a general economic-ethical methodology and clarified the essential steps involved in an economic-ethical inquiry. We then applied our methodology to the particular problem of minimum wages. The methodology we used is borrowed from Buchanan (1959, 1975), Buchanan and Tullock (1962), Brennan and Buchanan (1985), Homann (2000/2005) and Petrick and Pies (2007) and can be summarised in three fairly simple propositions. (1) Overcoming DS in pursuit of efficient outcomes is the central problem of economic-ethics. (2) The problem of DS is to be solved at the level of economic institutions through a change to a Pareto-superior rule. (3) The concept of a DS is to be used as a heuristic. Every interaction that is subject to economic-ethical investigation has to be modelled in terms of a DS, if possible. Since we were interested in a criterion for the ethical legitimacy of the minimum wage, we added a further claim namely that (4) an existing institutional arrangement is ethically justified, if and only if there is no Pareto-superior alternative. Due to the discussion of possible objections to our approach we extended our methodology further by stipulating that, (5) if we do not find a Pareto-better state of affairs, we should look for a Kaldor-Hicks-superior state. If we can find one, there is a potential for a Pareto-improvement.

Our case study yielded the following results. If we assume that labour markets are best described by what we called the standard model, a model that assumes perfect competition for labour, we can reconstruct the interaction between workers and firms in terms of a DS. Workers prefer minimum wages and firms, thus, choose a smaller number of workers than they would in the absence of a wage floor. The outcome involves a deadweight loss from minimum wages which, in turn, implies the possibility of a Kaldor-Hicks-improvement through the abolition of the minimum wage. We reasoned that in this situation a Pareto-improvement is conceivable and might be generated through a redistributive rule. Such a rule would (over)compensate workers for sacrificing the difference in expected utility between the minimum wage and the market wage. Since the rule would require that workers bind themselves to not lobbying for minimum wages, it would be able to stabilise a Pareto-superior outcome. The quintessence of our analysis was that minimum wages are not justifiable under the standard model, since a better solution is conceivable. If we assume, however, that the renegade model of minimum wages, a model that assumes a monopsonistic labour market structure, mirrors the facts better than the standard model, the minimum wage seems to be without alternative and is hence ethically justified. In the renegade case no potential for a Pareto-improvement exists. It is generally doubted, however, that the renegade view is an adequate way of looking at the labour market. As is consistent with the standard view, we, therefore, conclude that the economic-ethical legitimacy of the minimum wage is highly questionable unless clear indications exist that the monopsonistic conditions of the renegade view hold in a particular labour market. But even in that case the minimum wage does not get an ethical carte blanche. It is necessary to monitor the market structure and reconsider the case thoroughly, as indications emerge that employers’ bargaining power disappears. Furthermore, even in the renegade model a minimum wage is justified, only if it is efficient, i.e. if it is equal to the marginal productivity of labour and does not create excess supply. We believe that our discussion of the economic-ethics of the minimum wage has clarified why the two-worlds-paradigm is outdated and why, if we seek to evaluate the ethical status of minimum wages, we have to ask whether it leads to an efficient outcome. There is, as we have made clear, no contradiction between an efficient and an equitable outcome. We can have our cake and eat it too. To be more precise, we should, in fact, say: To have our cake we have to eat it too!

In regards to the conclusions drawn we would like to highlight a particular aspect that has not been emphasised enough. It is the fact that in our argument the ethical justification of the minimum wage depends entirely on its empirical properties. We stress this, because we would like to contrast our approach once more with the way in which the discussion about minimum wages is usually led. Both employer’s representatives and trade unionists tend to base their opinions on ideological positions. It is, for instance, argued that minimum wages are impermissible, because they interfere with the employer’s right and liberty to negotiate his own terms with employees. Another ideological view mostly uttered by worker’s representatives is simply that labour has to pay! A minimum wage is justified, because it is right out of principle, not for its desirable economic effects. We offer an alternative to these positions in asking: If we can make everyone better off, why should we not do it? Note that in doing this we make the answer to the question about the ethical legitimacy of minimum wages depend on the answer to the empirical-economic question, if everyone actually is better off due to minimum wages. In principle, we can confirm our economic hypothesis through the observation of a unanimous consent. Our approach to the problem of minimum wages has thus two advantages. First of all our ethical criterion of efficiency or unanimous consent it is rooted in democratic principles and should ensure the highest degree of consent practically possible. And in making the answer to the question about ethical legitimacy depend on the answer to an empirical scientific question, we confer upon it the highest possible degree of credibility and objectivity. In taking this approach we might still err, but only to the degree that people can err about their own preferences when they fail to recognise that a policy proposal is in their interest and to the degree that science can err about matters of fact. Both are, as we believe, tolerable risks.
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^1	  Early statements of the implementation problem of ethics date back at least until Hegel’s time. For a philosophical discussion see Hegel (1820/1971).
^2	  Even though the structure of the game is, thus, quite simple, it has a considerable analytical scope, since it can be generalised to a many-person interaction by designating one player to be ‘all others’ (Buchanan,  1991, 179).
^3	  Petrick and Pies (2007) summarise a few views uttered in the literature in regards to this claim. 
^4	  Other normative disciplines are aesthetics and epistemology.
^5	  Homann (2001) uses the same metaphor for the reverse case. He explains that in his book The Wealth of Nations (1776/1976) Adam Smith, a moral philosopher by profession, ‘mutates’ into an economist.   
^6	  This does not rule out the possibility of altruism. However, in an economic framework a concern about the well-being of others would be interpreted as one preference amongst others and internalised in the economic calculus of the individual.
^7	  Interestingly, Wicksell’s test, thus, accommodates the notion of revealed preferences and Pareto-efficiency both of which where advanced later in one simple formula.
^8	  For simplicity we neglect the fact that low-wage workers may differ in productivity. Differences in productivity have played a role in the empirical investigation of the economic consequences of minimum wage laws for some time, particularly in regards to the impact of minimum wages on unemployment amongst youths (e.g. Moore, 1971).
^9	  The theoretical extensions to two-sector economies have been developed by Welch (1974), Gramlich (1976) and Mincer (1976).
^10	  Since then, Card and Krueger (2000) have confirmed their initial findings using a different data set.
^11	  Under the premise of perfect competition the distributional effects of a subsidy paid to workers do not differ from the distributional effects of a subsidy paid to employers.
^12	  This does not mean that our economic-ethical approach rules out a social welfare state. It is conceivable that a worker is entitled to unconditional compensation, whenever her income falls below a certain threshold. This, however, has to be shown in a separate tract.
^13	  Note that we set this premise only for the sake of completeness. It does not influence the outcome, since the alternative preference order III > I > IV > II for workers leads to the same outcome.
^14	  For a discussion of a minimum wage which fulfills this requirement see Manning (2003).
